Re #72–theoretically, yes, but practically, no, as Terry Ryan isn’t stupid. (And with specific regard to the Twins’ #1 pick in ’05, no, because you can’t trade draftees until a year after they sign their contract.)

The A’s took Omar Quintanilla 33rd overall in 2003. He went 3 spots ahead of Adam Jones. Now they are trading him for a guy who has been terrible at the major league level . . . and who makes several million dollars. Somehow, I don’t think Michael Lewis is going to be writing about this. . . . I’m just pointing out that the vaunted A’s draft philosophy that the sabermetric community jumped on with both feet has been a pretty big disappointment in Oakland.

And dw (#24) responded:

Why is this such a huge disappointment[?] It seems like the A’s are acquiring the same number of decent prospects that an average team picks up, and they appear to be getting the same number of stinkers.

I’m with dw on this one, Dave. The main thrust of Moneyball was not that the A’s had discoverd some superior method of drafting prospects, but rather that the traditional scouting/tools method was such a crapshoot that there was little risk in trying something different. Even if they had failed utterly (and as I said, I agree with dw that they haven’t failed any more than most clubs who haven’t tried anything “new”), that willingness to buck tradition is admirable in a baseball culture that is exceedingly resistant to change. You could even argue that this trade is an example of how the philosophy works, despite its failings. By drafting players who are closer to MLB-readiness (in general), and being willing to dump them early enough that other FO’s haven’t quite figured out they aren’t going to be very good major leaguers (if even that), they are maximizing major-league return out of their draft.

I’ve never understood the offense the scouting community as a whole seems to have taken at this main point (even if I do understand why they reacted to the smug way the A’s FO was portrayed as responding to traditional scouting methods).

Lewis himself responded to somebody making a point similar to yours in a recent BP chat:

Joel (Washington, DC): I HAVE read the book and congratulate you on being provocative and adding a term to the baseball lexicon. At the same time, parts of it look pretty silly with the benefit of hindsight, especially the part on the A’s 2002 draft. What is your own assessment now of your analysis?

Michael Lewis: Oh, you’re so right, I am so silly, and you, with your hindsight, are the wise one! Seriously, did you grasp the main point of the draft chapters: that the odds of success in the draft done the old fashioned way were so poor that there was little risk in going about it a different way? That the A’s were not certain they had found a better way of doing it–that they only hoped that they had? That the whole thing they viewed as an experiment? And, anyway, how are you so sure their experiment was a failure? (It looks pretty good to me, especially given how quixotic their methods were.) Three of the players are big league regulars already, and it’s still very early. And you can’t really evaluate it out of context. The question is: were they any better than other teams in finding the talent IN THAT YEAR. I don’t know the answer–it isn’t yet knowable-but they certainly didn’t do badly.

It must be hard for players who suddenly face their inevitable declines.

Seeing him sobbing the other day, I think it may have taken the pressure off.

He might relax with the knowledge that he doesn’t have to meet the Seattle expectations and knowing there is someone else who believes in him (Ryan).

I hope he leads MN to the Wild Card and prevents Bos or NY from getting into the playoffs.

Pretty sure it’s contingent on Boone’s performance….