To answer your last question, with Betancourt batting behind him, I suspect the run-scoring likelihood of Ichiro up with two outs and no one on is pretty low. His own home run percentage is very low, and Betancourt’s numbers with two outs and men on base this year (courtesy ESPN.com) are 264/281/333.

How high should one rate probability of getting two consecutive sac bunts to advance and score the runner, and what probability (of scoring more runs) are you left with for Ichiro batting with two outs and no runners on base.

. My contention was the Mariners were actually better off bunting twice due to my perceived chances of LaHair/Cairo/Ichiro getting a hit. This was based on LaHair’s abilities vs LHP as well as how he looked in his first at bat, and Cairo.

Part of the flaw in your analysis is that you are comparing the possible results of a bunt to a hit, as though a hit is the only run-enhancing outcome of an at-bat if a bunt is not attempted. Anything hit on the ground to the right side would have the same result, as would anything hit deep to right or center, plus an error (already had one that inning; Barton looked awful at first all game). Plus, a hit if it occurred would enhance the run possibilities well beyond one.

Moreover, “how he looked in his first at bat” is a red herring argument. It’s like assuming that how Washburn looks in one of his one-two-three first innings is material to whether he’s pitching well in the fourth when he’s being battered around. That was the case with Gonzalez here. As far as I’m concerned, the only time to do what the M’s did here is in the ninth inning in a tie game at home.

My original post asked this . . .

How will “that” impact your scoring probability with a runner at 2nd base and no outs ?

“That” equals the situation described above. My contention was the Mariners were actually better off bunting twice due to my perceived chances of LaHair/Cairo/Ichiro getting a hit. This was based on LaHair’s abilities vs LHP as well as how he looked in his first at bat, and Cairo.

I never once contended that Riggleman was taking this into account, I never once suggested Riggleman was a good or bad tactician. I was simply asking the audience to accept the fact the players involved were good bunters, so that we could draw a reasonable expectation of their success in actually getting the bunts down.

I figured I had to add that piece of info to the puzzle due to all the fabulous bunting we have seen this season.

I believe in the statistical data, I fully accept that bunting (in general) is normally a bad tactical decision. I was simply pointing out a situation where I felt there was potential to go against “The Book”.

You and others immediately turned this into a Riggleman thing, while VJ (95.) offered an opinion that actually answered and countered my original premise. That was my goal with the original post. What is the best tactical decision for this situation ? Thanks for your input, VJ.

I’m offering a opinion that’s different than yours, prove me wrong.

From the helpfully linked at the top of the page USSM Orientation:

“The burden of proof is on the person who makes the assertion, and the wilder your assertion, the better your evidence should be. If you want to argue that Raul Ibanez is the best defensive left fielder ever, or that clutch hitting exists, or whatever, you need to bring the proof. “You need to disprove my theory” is not an acceptable argument, ever.”

This stuff is linked for a reason.

And people mention Riggleman because he’s the one making the stupid tactical decision in this case; accusing people who point out that what you’re saying makes no sense of having “Rigglemania” and/or some sort of personal grudge against Riggleman is neither helpful nor particularly tone-appropriate.

They also pretty much unanimously loved the two bunts. I’m sitting there appalled. Here is the game situation: you’ve just scored three runs, have a runner on second and no one out. The pitcher is reeling. The guy you have chosen to act as your designated hitter is at bat. The whole point of him playing (and presumably DHing) is that he’s got to prove he can hit lefties. You’ve got a lefty on the ropes, who has already issued a walk that inning to one lefty (Ibanez) and a double to another (Clement).

Here’s what you have when it’s over: one run, but two outs and no one on base. And given that he was allowed off the ropes, the pitcher then strikes out Ichiro, instead of facing him with men on base.

So basically, the two bunts increased the possibility (which became the reality) of scoring the fourth run in that inning, but completely took away the chance to score more than four runs. Which, given that there were none out at all, was a pretty good possibility, no matter who was up. If for no other reason than that three guys would have to bat before Yuni could hit into another double play, like the night before.

These statistical analysis don’t take into account the individuals involved.

Being a good bunter isn’t a good reason to bunt. YOu’re giving up an out. That’s ALWAYS bad. Most of the poorer major league hitters have a chance a non-negligible chance of getting a hit. A one in five chance of getting a hit is better than giving one up delibrately.

The only time it makes sense to bunt that early in a game is when a batter is so poor of a hitter, is so unlikely to get a hit, that you may has well use it to do SOMETHING. That means a pitcher.

Of course, that may mean Miguel Cairo, too, so maybe it’s not that far off…