How does a .304 BA, .394 OBP, & 13 HR 57 RBI’s sound for a LF?

I’d take it!

That’s a little like saying “I applaud you for betting the mortgage money on Black 13 at the roulette wheel”, in the case of the Bedard trade.

I’m not sure that the downside is as big as folks here make it out to be because even the best prospects wash out a majority of the time

So do the best established players (injury, declining skill set). In fact, when using sophisticated analysis that looks at minor league performance and scouting information, prospects AREN’T really riskier than established MLB players… and they have the bonus of being a hell of a lot cheaper.

The reality is that the Bedard trade was, on its face, not knowing what would happen in 2008, a bad deal for Bavasi to make at the time. Bavasi took a team that objective evidence suggested was a .500 team with significant problems, weakened it at two positions (OF and bullpen) that were problems all year in 2008, and while adding a superior player in the rotation, blew the farm system wad while ignoring other problems (DH, 1B, overall defense).

The fact that Bedard turned out to be damaged goods is just the cherry on top of the hot fudge sundae of awful decision making that went into this.

On the day it was made, it was a trade in the class of Denny McLain for Joe Coleman and the left side of the Senators’ infield, which won the Tigers the AL East in 1972. In other words, it overpriced the value of a single starting pitcher (though the Tigers at least threw in a few prospects, including Elliott Maddox, who was supposed to be good but wasn’t), and undervalued what was being traded for him.

It was also a trade in the nature of the 1998 Johnson trade, from the standpoint of the Astros (though they had enough in the farm system to replace the three guys we got, while the M’s couldn’t replace Adam Jones with anything all year).

Its best competitor for worst trade ever, the Slocumb trade, is a lot like the Doyle Alexander trade in 1987. The Tigers got what they wanted, a division title, and the Braves got 20+ years of John Smoltz. The M’s got similar results from Slocumb. But remember, at the time, it was the Cruz trade, not the Slocumb trade, that everyone was up in arms about.

The real difference between the Slocumb and Bedard is in the evaluation of where the team was, not what they were giving up. With four potential Hall of Famers in their primes, the 1997 M’s had a reasonable expectation of winning a lot of pennants if they could fill a hole. After that trade, Dan Wilson did indeed play in three playoff series (with perhaps the worst playoff batting record of any player ever), so it’s not like the M’s didn’t consider Varitek expendable. Lowe was considered a failure in his tryout in early 1997, and thus also expendable. While, as I’ve argued before, Sherrill was also expendable, Jones clearly was not, and the team’s complete misevaluation of the longterm prospects of three of its other starters makes the “throw-in” of three pitching prospects foolish in the extreme.

So, to reiterate, bad trade at the time. Might be worst trade ever. Can’t say so yet.

As far as Bedard goes? There was a pretty significant history of minor injuries, and minor injuries often lead to more major problems. Bedard presented a significantly higher risk of either continuing minor injuries costing him time OR a minor injury developing into something major, than most pitchers.

That people didn’t specifically predict a torn labrum doesn’t mean anything.

I just don’t see how you could take an injury totally unrelated to any other injury and then say that because he’s had other injuries, it was a correct prediction. That’s not scientific – it’s just a good guess. It would be one thing if he was missing every third start because of some minor tweak here or there. It’s completely another to say that those types of tweaks mean you’ll blow out an elbow or shoulder. You cannot know – even with probabilities because there are far too many variables genetically alone.

BTW, I am not a front office defender. I think the losing culture here is systemic and won’t be fixed until Howie and Chuck are out of the way. I just think, in investor’s terms, the present value of future production (i.e. that of the group of guys given up) has to be discounted on the risk of them not developing in the best case. Bedard had already shown his ability. You discount his value based on injury risk – but there is again no evidence of serious injury in his past – just a bunch of nagging stuff. This is no guarantee whatsoever that major injury is on the way.

BTW, I’m not saber-illiterate – I like walks, K’s, HR’s and all that stuff as much as THT, USSM, and all that. I was not particularly high on this team’s chances coming into this year, but even with an average offense and defense, which was not completely unreasonable, this pitching staff’s ability, with Bedard could contend. That’s what they play for right? Why play the schedule if you don’t give it a shot? And the assets are replaceable. Fontaine’s proven that IMO.

I’m disgusted with Riggleman for having the nerve to continue saying the team is “playing hard.”

I’m disgusted with the players, who, when faced with any pressure, always take the easy way out.

I’m disgusted with the strategy of an organization that has no idea on how to play the game, and does an abysmal job of teaching its prospects fundamentals.

I’m disgusted with the Mariners entire announcing crew who, in their failure to call a spade a spade, lack any credibility.

I’m disgusted with the elderly couple who, after my friend and me booed Richie Sexson, asked aloud if “we could do any better.” It’s a small thing, but it demonstrates the clubhouse atmosphere that exists in Seattle.

I’m disgusted with Erik Bedard, not for his injury, but for being a whiny and pouty major-leaguer who is too damn stupid and stubborn to see his riduclously good fortune in life.

And I’m disgutsed with people who tell me that “Bedard actually is a good guy.”

No, and hopefully for the last time, he is not. He treats people below him disgracefully. I’m not advocating a bunch of milk-driners make up the team, but the only thing major league about EB is his creepiness.

There. I feel better now.

But that’s the whole point, isn’t it? If you are an investor, you diversify your portfolio to moderate the risk… Bedard was a desperate gamble on a razor-thin upside.

Thank you, notanangrygradstudent, for getting the gist of it. I’m amazed at the amount of desire to defend the Bedard trade. Anywho, about the razor-thin margin.

That’s one of the big problems with the M’s under Bavasi. Most of their deals required the guy(s) they got to max out their possible results. Bedard had to be a Cy Young contender. Vidro and Sexson had to bounce nearly 100% back to pre-injury, pre-30th birthday, performance. Washburn had to duplicate his career year four times over.

In other words, they buy high. Or else they are high when they buy…

By that logic, the M’s traded 4 guys with significant injury risk (because that’s inherent in pitchers) plus one excellent (but not a sure thing) prospect for a pitcher coming off a stellar season who’s always shown Cy Young level stuff and potential.

But that’s the whole point, isn’t it? If you are an investor, you diversify your portfolio to moderate the risk. Given the choice, one doesn’t dump one’s entire life savings into a single financial institution. If you had investments only in Lehman Brothers, you are now completely hosed. If you had investments in Lehman and three other companies that aren’t investment banks, you may still be hurting, but you probably didn’t lose everything.

Yes, there was a chance that Bedard would have been very, very good. But even if he had been Cy Young himself, it was a long shot for the M’s to be contenders this year, and most people not in the Mariner front office knew that at the time. Bedard was a desperate gamble on a razor-thin upside. When desperate gambles go bad, it is entirely justifiable to look back at them and shake your head about the decision-making.