Management Review
We talk a lot about player performance, their values, their worth relative to salary, and the context in which they help the team win. Through the conversation on player value, we infer a lot of things about our beliefs of the team’s management, though, I realize, we rarely state those things outright. So, since it’s a pretty slow period in Mariner-land, I figured now would be a good time to lay out my personal feelings on the Mariner front office, how they operate, what they do well, and what they could do better. Keep in mind, this is my opinion, and Derek, Jeff, and Jason may not agree with anything or everything that I write. So, try not to take this as the USSM decree on the organization. This is Dave’s opinion, for better or worse.
Organizational Strengths
Bill Bavasi is remarkably honest and personable.
This may not seem like that big of a deal, but you’d be amazed at how far this can go in cultivating good relationships with other teams, agents, and players, and how beneficial that can be in the long run. The M’s have done a very good job at building relationships throughout the game, keeping lines of communication open, and gaining respect from other ballclubs. You’d be hard pressed to find too many people who will say a bad word about Bill Bavasi as a person, which is in stark contrast to the end of the Pat Gillick era, when about half the organization basically hated the other half.
As a whole, the Mariners value young players.
It might be hard to remember, what with the constant Jeremy Reed trade rumors, but the M’s philosophy has shifted significantly the past few years from a win-with-veterans attitude to one where players under the age of 25 are no longer looked at with disdain. Did the M’s acquire a lot of 30+ players this offseason? Yes, but with the exception of Washburn and Johjima, all were signed to one year contracts. The team is going into spring training with Lopez, Betancourt, and Reed comprising a third of their opening day line-up. Whether it was a wise decision or not, they jettisoned Yorvit Torrealba and replaced him with Rene Rivera. Can you imagine any circumstance where Pat Gillick would have traded the “proven veteran” in order to create a spot for a 22-year-old with little experience above Double-A?
The team spends a lot of money.
For as much grief as the organization gets for being a money-making machine (and they are), the team’s payroll is still consistently among the upper tier of organizations. They may not spend all their net revenues on the roster, which is a topic for another day, but they spend more than enough to build a contending team. Yes, we wish they’d spend a little more, considering that they’re running one of the most profitable sports franchises around, but they’re spending enough. Unlike a number of other cities, the payroll is not the problem.
Bob Fontaine is a terrific scouting director.
Replacing Frank Mattox with Fontaine is the management level equivalent of pinch hitting Richie Sexson for Wiki Gonzalez. Fontaine’s going to strike out some and isn’t the best scouting director around, but he’s pretty darn good, and, well, I’ll let the Mattox-Wiki comparison speak for itself. Fontaine is a skilled talent evaluator who isn’t beholden to a philosophy. He’s not blindly drafting every 6’8 lefty from the Midwest because of a pet theory that they develop well. He’s got his guys finding players, whether they be in high school or college, and drafting players they know they can sign. For the first time since the end of the 1990s, the Mariners are actually returning value on their draft picks.
The front office wants to win. Really.
Howard Lincoln has been villified for some of his remarks the past several years about building a contender instead of trying to win the world series. People have taken his comments to mean that the M’s would be happy to win 90 games every year and never win a championship, and from that, a hatred for the upper level front office has been born. It’s misguided, however. Lincoln’s comments basically echo the Billy Beane philosophy – build as good of a regular season team as I can, year in and year out, and let the playoffs sort themselves out. Whether people want to believe it or not, there are just far too many unpredictabe events in multiple short playoff series to actually build a championship club ahead of time. The best thing you can do is give your team as many good chances in the postseason as possible, and that’s exactly what Lincoln was referencing.
The M’s, as an organization, really want to win a World Series. But they’re not going to give away talent to increase the chances of winning one by .01 percent in any given year. They understand the cost/benefit analysis leans away from making crazy deadline deals, and they’ve done a good job at making smart decisions in the face of public outcry. Remember, the Lowe/Varitek for Slocumb deal has done far more damage to the team than any number of Andy Benes acquisitions could hope to make up for.
Organizational Weaknesses
They evaluate players based on their best case outcome.
The club shares this trait with a large percentage of their fanbase. It’s a pretty common analytical flaw. It’s especially prevalent with people who talk about their organization’s prospects in glowing terms. Everyone is evaluated by what they might be, not by what they are. The Mariners have consistently handed out contracts that will only make sense if the player performs at the absolute peak of what can be expected based on their talent level. A player’s risk factor is a minor point in talent evaluation. You can see an obvious trend through the past several years of player acquisition. Risk abounds.
Richie Sexson and Raul Ibanez paid off. Adrian Beltre (after one year), Scott Spiezio, Ryan Franklin, and Shigetoshi Hasegawa did not. We don’t think Jarrod Washburn or Carl Everett will, but Matt Lawton certainly could, and we expect Kenji Johjima to pay off in spades. Take enough risks, you’re going to win a few, but you will lose too many to make it a good strategy. The M’s discount risk in player evaluation far too much, and as such, end up with a lot of clunkers who don’t meet their expectations.
They refuse to accept the concept of replacement level.
This certainly isn’t unique to the Mariners. Most clubs prefer not to have to explain to their fanbase why they are counting on Bobby Livingston as their 5th starter heading into spring training when they’re hawking several thousand dollar season ticket packages. It is the rare club indeed that is willing to tell their fans to trust them and throw Justin Duchscherer into a prominant role in a pennant chase. But the fact that most clubs in baseball would rather pay millions for players who have experience at sucking in the major leagues does not make it a worthwhile strategy. The plain fact is that the Mariners could replace a significant amount of the bottom tier of their roster with similarly talented players who cost a fraction of the price, and then spend the surplus on bringing in more upper tier players, and they’d have a better team for the same price.
But it’s a hard move to sell to the general public who equates the term minor league with scrub. So, instead of taking bold steps to build the most efficient roster possible, we get several million dollars of fan appeasement in the form of lousy bench players that people have heard of. There’s a saying in the IT world that no one ever got fired for buying Cisco, and it applies here. It’s an easy sell to your boss and the fans that you can’t be held responsible for Scott Spiezio falling apart because, well, he hit in the majors last year. If you’ve got Justin Leone hitting .189, however, you’re going to get ripped to pieces.
It takes some serious stones to build a roster knowing that you’re going to get hammered for its construction. You have to have faith that it’s going to work, and that in the end, it’s the right thing to do for the best interest of the franchise. There aren’t a lot of GMs in baseball who have that conviction. We don’t have one, that’s for sure.
They value the predictive power of ERA.
You can tie a significant amount of their bad decisions on pitchers directly to the value they place on ERA. Shigetoshi Hasegawa got a 2 year deal for posting a fluky 1.48 ERA, then predictably went in the tank. Joel Pineiro was projected as a frontline starter based on two seasons early in his career where his ERA was significantly better than his peripheral statistics. And now we get Jarrod “3.20″ Washburn.
The team has to learn the fallibility of ERA. It’s not a good predictor of future performance, and as long as they keep leaning on it as a significant tool in deciding which pitchers to keep or acquire, they’re going to end up being disappointed.
They overestimate their abilities to discern character.
I want to make it clear that I’m not writing off the value of clubhouse leadership, hustle, or other intangibles simply because we have no way to measure them. I’m fairly certain that those things add value to a ballclub in ways that we have no ability to discern. However, my contention is that we aren’t the only ones who can’t predict intangibles ahead of time. The M’s have clearly and consistently made decisions on players based on character assertions that have been wildly wrong. Rich Aurilia was brought in because he worked harder than Carlos Guillen. Scott Spiezio was acquired because he was a clutch hitter. Eddie Guardado wasn’t traded because he’s a warrior who sets the tone for the bullpen. Jamie Moyer, Dan Wilson, and Bret Boone were valued for their veteran leadership.
And with all those intangibles running loose, the team was terrible. There were consistent complaints about a lack of leadership and desire to win, despite the fact that nearly half the players on the team were acquired for their abilities to lead and be winners. The sooner the Mariners realize they’re in the talent evaluation business and not in psychoanalysis, the better off they will be. It’s okay to believe in the value of clubhouse leadership but also admit that you have no idea how to predict it. Stop acquiring players because of their expected intangibles. It just doesn’t work.
Chuck Armstrong and Howard Lincoln suck at public relations.
The M’s should seriously look into bringing in a minority owner just to be the face-of-the-ownership, a guy to stand in front of the media and say the right things. Angels fans love Arte Moreno because he spends a lot of money and says the right things. Mariner fans hate Armstrong and Lincoln because they spend a lot of money and say the wrong things. The M’s ownership group has been a financial success and a public relations nightmare. A huge majority of the fanbase has strong negative feelings towards the people who run the club. If the ownership group had a likable person in the group-someone, anyone, just throw us a bone-it’d do a huge amount to turn the tide of public hatred.
What They Should Try To Improve Upon
Learn from their mistakes.
Jarrod Washburn is the starting pitching version of Shigetoshi Hasegawa circa two years ago. They just stepped in the same pile they did back then. As a fan, that’s frustrating. I have no doubt that the M’s perform internal reviews of their decisions and try to glean information from the hits and misses. I’m just not convinced they are learning the lessons they need to learn. They need to accept that the mistakes they’ve made the past two years were not isolated flukes and make changes to the organizational philosophies to right the ship. They need to make better decisions, and to do that, they have to understand what they did wrong to get them to this point.
Rebuild their relationship with the fans.
This isn’t about cute commercials or selling a family friendly atmosphere. There’s a significant amount of the population that are frustrated and angry with the team, and the M’s have done little to try to appease those feelings. They raised ticket prices again. They failed to bring in any impact talent during the offseson. And the Mariners caravan running through the state consists of Greg Dobbs and Rick Rizzs showing up and paying people to take their autographs.
They need to get the passionate fan back on board. I’m not a marketing guy, so I’ll withold any of my crappy ideas, but they certainly have to come up with a way to alleviate some of the negative feelings that the people who spend money on the team have towards the organization.
Win.
Pretty generic, but, in the end, if the current front office wants to stay in place past the 2006 season, they have to win baseball games this year. There’s little chance that the current baseball operations department can survive another last place finish. For Bill Bavasi and his staff, this is a make or break season. Another 75 win year, and we’ll be stumping for Chris Antonetti to get an interview this time around.
I especially agree with Dave’s first point. Even though I will sometimes disagree with Bavasi’s moves, I recognize that he has one asset that a GM must have: a personable quality that makes people like him, want to work with him, and engenders trust and mutual respect. IMO, if Depodesto had half of Bavasi’s ability to cultivate solid personal relationships, he would still be LA’s GM.
I did like it.
However I have no reason to believe that anything will change under the current administration. For this year, I see two possible outcomes, both ugly.
1. Bavasi gets lucky and his poor signings work out, meaning Everett and Washburn, which will reinforce his poor selection process. This will mean we go after more proven veterans that other teams are avoiding quite successfully. They’ll not learn the lesson of replacement level player and they’ll continue to sign old, old, old guys. (I’m 43, saying 35 is old is brutaly honest for me.)
2. This all blows up in his face, the fan base is outraged and stops going to Safeco which in turn crushes the payroll. This will force the FO the go to another ‘veteran’ GM who will continue the same mistakes and we’ll exist like the Met’s.
I like to think I’m a half-full kind of guy however history is not on the side of the Ms FO. Furthermore, if they can’t learn from their history, they are doomed to repeat it.
Re:
“just throw us a bone”
Jay Buhner?
Russ, I’m not so sure that if Bavasi lucks out this year that he’ll continue to sign “older” guys. As Dave points out, the older player signings, except for Washburn, tended to be for shorter terms (and there aren’t that many younger free agents to be had this year).
Moreover, the thinness of the the farm system tends to drive these older player signings; a lot of the fan base is stuck in the youth-for-the-sake-of-youth mode. If the younger player is gonna be significantly WORSE than the older vet, then I would have to back the signing of the vet, particularly if its for short term money.
The M’s late and awkward response to the $70 million payroll story only underscores Dave’s point about poor public relations. This is information from the commissioner’s office, so the front office should have known it was coming and spotted the sizable difference in the payroll numbers. The team should have prepared a press release in advance or planted the story with Thiel no later than the day after the AP story.
For an organization that excels at marketing, its public relations work is shockingly inept.
John Ellis used to be that Public Face of the Ownership, for me, I liked him, and felt that he really wanted to win a World Series…
On the negative side, I would put “development of young pitchers”. It’s hard to be more specific than this, because no one really knows what’s wrong, but something is definitely wrong. Maybe it’s just bad luck. I don’t think so, but even then, they need to “improve their luck in the development of young pitchers.” Anderson, Heaverlo, Blackley, Meche, Soriano, Pineiro, Nageotte, Baek…
Bill Bavasi is remarkably honest and personable.
so, would this be an appropriate place to pop in a brief summary of Bavasi’s remarks on KOMO last night?
Yep.
Nice breakdown Dave. We can only hope that the M’s FO will learn about some of their misguided beliefs such as ‘ERA’ and ‘character’ sooner than later.
Based on your assessment, who would actually ‘hire’ personnel? I remember you commented some time ago that Matt Olkin (sp?) is only a consultant who gives no stat input unless the M’s FO asks for it.
Considering the amount of money they gamble with year in and year out, doesn’t it make the best business sense to have as much information on hand to help in the decision making of player acquisitions?
The Thiel article shows there was a gross waste of funds in bad signings last year.
It seems like having Olkin as a full time employee, not to mention having one or two psychologists on the payroll to assist in assessing character would be a smart investment to minimize the risk in potential bad player signings.
One way to look at this is the organization, thanks to their offseason moves, is going to have an opportunity to “learn” from their mistakes come this offseason- because this team doesn’t look like a team that’s going to finish out of 4th place.
One wonders if Theo and DePodesta will still be around come October 2006- or if the Mariners will actually be open to hiring them.
It’s sort of unfair to be burying Bavasi at this point (and who knows- the M’s could get lightning in a bottle, win 90, sneak into the playoffs and get hot)…but it seems to me it’s unlikely there’s going to BE the systematic re-evaluation with current management in place.
This is a SWOT Matrix (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats) minus the Threats quadrant. The major threat is pretty glaring – the ALW got a lot tougher this winter.
Once again Chuck and Howie will spend according to budget, assume they’ll make the playoffs and hope to luck out once there. There is no contingency plan other than firing quite a good GM if their assumption isn’t realized.
It isn’t at all clear that Chuck and Howies’ “fire and forget” hands-off management is good enough anymore in the ALW.
Oh, and one other thing…
They refuse to accept the concept of replacement level.
There is, of course, the M’s infatuation with certain minor league players for rather unfathomable (Greg Dobbs, Matt Thornton) or transparent (Willie Bloomquist) reasons. So it’s not even that they aren’t willing to go with their minor league system or “free talent”- it’s that the decisions they make there don’t really stand up to solid rational analysis.
This is a SWOT Matrix (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats) minus the Threats quadrant. The major threat is pretty glaring – the ALW got a lot tougher this winter.
Basically, the “threats” quadrant is that the Mariners become the West Coast version of the Orioles or Mets- decent attendance because of market and ballpark factors, plenty of payroll, years out of the playoffs and contention because the rest of the division has stepped on their throat. This year was the first time one of those two teams had even a sniff at contention this millennium- and in Baltimore’s case, it was all over by July 15 (record after that point: 25-48).
The entire front office? True. We’re talking about everybody from the guy answering the phones to the accountant down the hall.
Chuck and Howie? False. Chuck and Howie insist on profitability. If winning happens, OK.
Here’s a mental excercise. Give Chuck and Howie a choice between the following guaranteed outcomes.
1) A WS ring yes, but unprofitability in 2 seasons out of 5.
2) Not even a pennant but top ten profitability for 5 seasons.
Chuck and Howard don’t even consider that a choice.
Don’t spin this into “payroll doesn’t guarantee wins.” The point is that the goal of franchise senior management is not, never has been, and still isn’t winning.
Chuck and Howie are very good at what they do and what they do isn’t winning baseball games.
Generally good analysis. I would discount the “public relations” aspects of Lincoln and Armstrong. A winning, well managed team will remove any need for better spokesmanship by the top executives.
1. Any way you slice it, two consecutive 90-loss seasons is a dreadful outcome for one of the most profitable, high attendance franchises in the game. A player payroll above $90 million—yielding two 90-plus-loss seasons—shows a dreadful misallocation of resources.
2. Bavasi’s dad worked for Branch Rickey, who always said: “Move a player a year too early…not a year too late.” Bavasi Jr. not only has kept big-salary players a year too long—when they no longer could be traded for value—but has acquired new players discarded by others because they were over the hill. Boone clearly was waning in mid-2004 and should have been traded before the deadline. The team was headed nowhere anyay. Hasegawa was kept too long. Moyer and a high-risk Guardado are likely to run out of gas sometime this year. But both are being paid high salaries. Bavasi acquired Aurilia and Spiezio after their former teams recognized they were out of gas. This year he has done it with Everett and Lawton. Vina
and Appier are not going to make the team, and involve no financial risk, yet will clutter the spring roster and take playing time, before they are released, from younger prospects.
The earlier comment is quite right. The Mariners should be acquiring a Tejada, for another year and a few more bucks, and a Millwood or Weaver, also for another year or more bucks, at the top of the roster. rather than a mediocre Washburn, while filling the bench with younger, hungry players.
Bottom line: Examine the rosters of the other three AL West teams.
All are stronger than the M’s, who are headed for another last-place finish. As a business, the Mariners are cost inefficient. They are investing lots of money in mediocrity rather than making the most of fewer dollars. They are profitable. The owners are getting a good return on their investment. But the fans are not.
If the goal of Lincoln and Armstrong was profit at all costs, but the team played in New York instead of Seattle and the payroll was set at $250 million because of the excess revenues, would we even be having this conversation?
No, of course not. If you don’t think Lincoln or Armstrong care at all about winning, you’re fooling yourself. Yes, they’re strict businessman who insist on working on a budget that guarantees profitability. But the budget is easily high enough to build a contending club. The M’s have more than enough money to win. They need to spend it better.
Guardado [is] likely to run out of gas sometime this year. But [is] being paid high salaries.
In this market, Guardado’s salary is a bargain.
17-
Seriously, how do you know? You talk to them? Telepathy?
If Mariner management was THAT interested in profit over winning, they could have easily slashed and burned payroll to Tampa levels (and don’t think Ichiro wouldn’t net you some nice prospects), draw 1.5 million or more from a nice park (which is 18.5 average attendance- Milwaukee and Pittsburgh do that, and they haven’t won in years), rake in the money from current local media/national TV deals, and easily make money that way. What exactly is the point of spending $50 extra million on payroll to get maybe 1 million extra in attendance unless you think it will help you win?
Or hell, take advantage of “greater fool theory”, and sell the team for over half a billion. Why not lock in the return from the initial investment now- instead of putting out a bad team for years and years and not having as much leverage when it comes time to renegotiate local TV and radio deals, and potentially not having the sort of profit you’re used to? Why not let that be the next guy’s problem?
Then there’s the fact we know that when the M’s win, they draw well- they’ve lost almost a million fans in the seats from their peak (2001-2002). You think they might want those fans back? You think those fans WILL come back if we’re the West Coast version of the Orioles, always in 4th place?
Evan:
Who cares about the market. The M’s weren’t looking in the FA market for relief pitching. That’s a fools’ game anyway.
The choices were pretty much Guardado closing in 2006 for about $7M including incentives, or Soriano or Putz for $450,000.
I’m reminded of the Kevin Spacey’s Verbal Kint in The Usual Suspects saying, “The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.”
Why do people accept Chuck and Howie’s promise to “Kill Bill” for losing? Does Bill run the franchise? Or do Chuck and Howie?
For me, it would mean much more for Chuck and Howie to come out and say “We will be in the playoffs this year or I’ll resign.”
Don’t throw me a bone – put your head on a plate. That way I’ve got something to look forward to either way.
Yes, they’re strict businessman who insist on working on a budget that guarantees profitability. But the budget is easily high enough to build a contending club.
Cases in point: the 2005 World Champion Chicago White Sox, the 2005 National League Champion Houston Astros, the 2004 National League Champion St. Louis Cardinals, the 2002 World Champion Anaheim Angels. (Florida, the Red Sox and Yankees obviously don’t fit into this model wel, for different reasonsl.)
It’s not the payroll that’s the problem- it’s the decisions on where to spend the payroll, plus the institutional neglect of the farm system and corresponding rot that set into the major league team. The former is actually being fixed under current management, and is probably the biggest glass-half-full reason to be optimistic about the future. The biggest problem (and the cause for glass-half-empty pessimism) is that we continue to make roster decisions that keep us from fixing the latter, as Dave identified.
Pretty much right on, Dave. I happen to be acquainted with a member of the front office, and it’s been amazing to me to hear things like “we got Spiezio because he’s a great clutch hitter” and “we’re bringing in Carl Everett because of his hustle and the win-at all-costs attitude he’ll bring to the clubhouse.”
One point you didn’t emphasize enough in my opinion is that despite Bavasi’s admirable refusal to trade youth for a perceived quick fix, the M’s are still turning a blind eye to the aging process when they sign free agents. I guess that comes under your “best case scenario” evaluation, but it seems like they just don’t understand that you can’t expect career years from anybody in their thirties. Is it really possible that the Bret Boone exception has screwed up their thinking entirely? What they should be doing (and they are, but on a limited basis) is amassing young pitching talent so that when Felix is ready to lead us into the World Series, there will be two or three other top starters to compliment him. It’s not like they’re going to be contending during the Carl Everett era, so what’s the point of bringing him in and wasting resources that could be put to much better use elsewhere (that’s a rhetorical question–you don’t have to answer)?
It’s not a question of replacing Eddie with Soriano. It’s a question of replacing Eddie with whoever the extra guy in the bullpen is (someone below Thornton on the depth chart).
I don’t like pledges to make the postseason because it requires that other teams behave in ways over which you have no control. Winning 90 games is no less of an achievement if other teams in your division happen to be ahead of you.
I’m sure the M’s could have found a pitcher below Thornton on the depth chart for less than $7M, even in this market.
Shoot, they might even have found one better.
Dave, thanks for the thoughtful analysis. Fantastic post.
One quibble: I’m not so sure I’d hold up Arte Moreno as an example of an owner who says all the right things … considered he’s currently embroiled in a nasty lawsuit over his renaming of the team. Maybe it’s just 10 percent of the fans doing 90 percent of the screaming, but they sure are making some noise down there in Anaheim.
I agree with most everything that Dave wrote, especially the part about public relations and marketing. I believe in my heart that Howard Lincoln wants to win a World Series. It’s just that he wants to do it HIS way. That’s the problem…he needs to step back, shut up, and provide the tools for his baseball people to deliver the goal…a World Series. I have met Howard and he came across as arrogant and meddlesome. I asked him why they didn’t sign this player or that player and he spoke badly about the players in question and said that they weren’t the type of people he wanted on his team. There was no mention of the players’ past accomplishments or potential contribution on the field.
As far as Bavasi, I view Bavasi as someone who is paying for the sins of the past regime. He has almost no high-level minor league talent and no one to trade so he is forced to go out on the mediocre free agent market and overpay. This is a direct result of Pat Gillick and years of poor minor league talent evaluation by the organization’s cronies. I know there are those who say he should just save the money for a better free agent class, but I feel that would be a cop out to M’s fans who are paying to see the best possible product. He HAS to spend the money. Also, he held on to players too long, I believe, because they had marketing appeal and Lincoln woanted to keep them for that.
I see this past offseason as an indication that Bavasi is spearheading change within the organization. Signing Everett and Lawton showed me that there is finally more focus on what a player might be able to do on the field rather than on his potential marketing appeal. While Everett and Lawton aren’t going to lead them to the promised land, at least it shows that the M’s are not going to be run by their marketing department any longer.
I think the final point rings the truest. The Mariners really really need to win this year, I just don’t think they will. I mean I think the team won’t be an embarrasment but they’re going to have a hard time finishing higher than third in the division.
The bottom line is the fans will hate ownership a lot less if they win.
Thanks for the detailed breakdown, Dave, you make a whole lot of sense.
Signing Everett and Lawton showed me that there is finally more focus on what a player might be able to do on the field rather than on his potential marketing appeal.
That would be a more impressive argument if Everett could demonstrate an ability to do anything on the field, other than be a below-average DH.
Colm -
Better than Eddie? Because that’s really what we’re talking about. Could you find someone better than Eddie for less than $7M? If not, getting rid of Eddie makes the bullpen worse.
ec -
He did say might. I’d agree that someone like Russ Branyan instead of Carl would demonstrate that the M’s are actually getting better at evaluating talent, but that’s a different issue.
Talent evaluation? Is Mattox still involved in that?
#31 – Let me rephrase that. I should have said “there is more focus on what a player might be able to do to help his team win then on his potential marketing appeal.” Everett was brought in to not only provide decent “left-handed sock” at a relatively low cost but also to shake things up in the clubhouse. This could potentially help the team win games. It may not happen, but at least there is a thought process I can follow. Signing guys because they are likeable or clean-living does not help win games. It is simply a marketing ploy (one that has worked, by the way)aimed at drawing in the casual family-oriented fan (who you see a lot of at Safeco).
Better than Eddie? Because that’s really what we’re talking about. Could you find someone better than Eddie for less than $7M? If not, getting rid of Eddie makes the bullpen worse.
Right, but someone at the league minimum with Eddie’s roster spot means we have about 6.7 million to play with in 2006. If the options you’re choosing from are Eddie + Carl Everett and (as an example) Bazardo + Brian Giles, I’d say the odds are decent the latter combination would outperform the former (basically, the historical precdent for some minor leaguer with a live arm and decent peripherals coming in and having a decent year is pretty good- just in the last few years for the M’s we’ve had Soriano, Putz and Mateo do it). Granted, there’s the implications of having Giles on a multi-year deal- but the whole argument goes back to Dave’s point of “grit” and intangibles being given undue weight.
That being said, Guardado’s really not a terribly inexcusable waste of money, going back to what Dave said a while back. That’s reserved in my mind for Everett and Washburn, who really ARE cases where the M’s might have well just set bushel baskets of hundred dollar bills on fire.
I am glad to hear Dave’s thoughtful report on the Ms management, but I am increasingly frustrated with the fan’s perspective that the Ms FO does not care enough about winning. I have several points to make against the view that management is more concerned with profit than winning:
1) Of course the president and CEO are concerned with profit. They are four degrees separated from the people who are most responsible for winning- the players. They are one or zero degrees separated from the people responsible for turning a profit. They are concerned with profit because that is their role with the Mariners.
2) If on whole it is true, it is not necessarily a bad thing. The most basic element of business is making a profit. If you don’t do that, it effects all other business operations. The current Mariner ownership turned a bad franchise into one of the better franchises in the game, on and off the field. That transformation was made possible in part by making a priority of budget and profit. (And in part by tax payer money.)
3) I believe the FO put’s the GM in a great position to succeed. They have a consistent and ample budget that contains some flexibility for the right circumstances. This set of circumstances came about because of the solid financial foundation set by (you guessed it) budget and profit.
In the end, I speculate that criticisms of the dispositions of the president and CEO are probably due to fan frustration with not winning a title when we were good, and now, not being good at all. That is understandable. Could the FO be better? Sure, and in a lot of ways. But the problems of the Seattle Mariners on the field simply *do not* stem from the club turning a profit.
#35: This seems to imply that there’s some causal effect between Everett’s personality and the Chicago White Sox winning the World Series. Much as Spiezio and Aurilia did for the 2002 Angels and Giants?
with kind permission, a brief summary of Bavasi on KOMO last night–Glasgow, Blowers & Drayer asked the questions, and Bill answered in a stream of consciousness kind of way….
He mentioned again that this was not a strong free agent class, esp. for pitchers– it seemed almost from what he said that the value of Washburn would be more to push Meche & Piniero down in the rotation, and hopefully push them as pitchers as well– he also mentioned that Jose needs to earn 2nd this spring, and that Jeremy needs to have a better year this year– and that they are not shopping him; there is a lot of interest in him, and they have to listen to offers because they are so thin on depth, but they are not trying to get rid of him.
Pitching led to the change in pitching coach, and Bavasi mentioned that he had known Price since BP was a player, and how much he liked & admired him– and that he felt that BP was frustrated by the fact he couldn’t get Joel & Gil to develop any further the last few years. With Chaves, he said that they had narrowed the field down to a few guys, and talking with Chaves sealed the deal for him — he also mentioned that they had talked to (the still un-signed) Jamie who gave them what Bill felt was a very objective read on Chaves, and a very positive one.
So, is it a freudian slip that Bavasi mentioned “left-handed punch” when addressing the Everett signing?
He does understand that he is a controversial sign, but claims that when they talked in Texas about potential hitters, that it was Mike & the coaches who wanted Carl — for his make-up, even if it “is at times not pretty”
Opening day? Felix is too young, he’s not starting the first game of the year. He’s going to be a special problem for Mike, as he starts the year at age 19 and they are not going to push him. It will be a problem, though, especially if he keeps pitching deep into games as he did last season; they may have to skip starts or take other measures to keep him healthy now and for years to come … even if it is an unnatural thing to skip a pitcher who is hot.
Is it number of pitches? Is it innings? what is the measuring stick for Felix? It is pitch counts within the game– if he gets to 100 pitches in a game, Mike will start to look at him to pull him. You could go as high as 125 pitches, but you don’t want to, not with a pitcher this young.
Could you treat a start like a bullpen, say he will start, but only go 50 pitches, say? well, it might be something you could do, if you knew you have a rested bullpen to follow him.
When asked about Beltre, Bavasi mentioned that Jeff Pentland has already started working with a number of the guys here & in Peoria, and the hitters have given him high marks so far; the organization think Jeff is the right kind of guy to work with a big strong guy like Adrian, the kind of player he has had success with in the past. They plan to have Adrian get together with him early in Arizona, so they have a relationship going into ST.
Where are you now, at this point of the off-season? At this point of the winter, it is probably more like the feeling at the July trade-deadline, in that you have a specific thing you are looking for from other clubs — for example, they still need to see what is there starting pitching-wise; if there is any chance to upgrade. If they have indeed heard all there is to hear from all the other clubs, to get more pitching via a trade they would have to blow another hole in the club that would then need filling, so….
Clint Nageotte will get a shot as a starter in spring; he is in great shape (which he wasn’t last spring, off his injury) and seems much more focused — he may not break the rotation, but he’ll get a chance.
A 12-man pitching staff this year? They’d talked about that just that afternoon, and about the bench– they’d like to carry 11, but it might have to be twelve if the rotation ends up the sort that can’t go deep, or if you need to skip Felix a lot, and the bullpen can’t handle it.
Lawton? Bench, but it also depends on how the everyday players play– Matt is trying to re-establish himself, and is very motivated; if someone gets hurt, or can’t play, there is a left-handed bat eager to come off the bench…
38-
The argument you’re making for Everett is the same argument we’ve heard ad nauseam for Spiezio, Aurilia, Guardado, and so on- the importance of what they’ll do in the clubhouse. If Carl Everett is such a difference-maker in the clubhouse, how is it that he didn’t help his teams win in 2003, when he actually had his best season in recent memory (career high in games played, OPS of .876)? For all Eddie’s wonderful grit (and I’ve heard Bavasi laud it), it hasn’t meant bukpus as far as Mariner winning seasons during his contract, now, has it?
The fact is that Everett’s had ONE good year in his last 5 (and that year was spent in hitter’s ballparks), and his numbers the last two years are well below what an AVERAGE DH hits in the AL. He has a lousy injury history and contributes nearly nothing on defense. There’s simply no objective evidence that he’s anything other than some below-average player being handed a job because he fit a salary slot and perceived need the Mariners had (“must get ‘proven’ left handed bat for cheap”)- and as Dave said, the M’s track record on guessing who can make the team better via “intangibles” sucks the last few years, so why the hell should I believe they’ve got it right now?
#23– “Why do people accept Chuck and Howie’s promise to “Kill Bill†for losing? Does Bill run the franchise? Or do Chuck and Howie?”
when have Armstrong or Lincoln said they would fire Bavasi? All I have seen are Bavasi’s commments that he assumes he will be gone if they have another bad year.
I believe the entire FO wants to win. From top to bottom, no doubt they all want to win. Losing is not fun; winning is the best kind of fun.
The trouble is the FO can’t seem to realize why some teams have success and some teams fail. The dollars are a factor but they are most certainly not the most important thing to building a roster of players who all contribute. They are not good at evaluating and valuing talent. They put far too many dollars to the intangibles and not enough dollars to the repeatable skills. Wash, rinse, repeat…season after season.
Yes, it’s clear to me that the front office does not have a clear picture on evaluating talent (this most certainly applies to Mattox, given his track record). And it seems to me that this particular failing comes from the baseball people, as the non-baseball people like the owners have had enough experience in the business world as dot.com folks to take advantage of every single possible or improbable edge to get ahead (the McCaws, the Raikes et al would be looking at the stats end of things I think….)
I’d be interested to know DMZ’s, JMB’s and Jeff’s takes on all this. And Peter’s, assuming he’s still alive.
I agree with just about everything here, and the only issues I’m unsure on are the ones Dave knows far more about, so I trust his judgment.
#39: One thing I found interesting from Bavasi’s “Hot Stove League” chat last night is that Vina was brought in specifically to push Lopez at second base … meaning that Willie Bloomquist is not considered a serious contender for a starting job.
I wonder how that will affect his upcoming arbitration case.
meaning that Willie Bloomquist is not considered a serious contender for a starting job.
Unless someone stole Bill’s brain at the winter meetings, I should hope not.
I don’t disagree, but I think Willie Dynamite and his agent will see things differently. It would be interesting to host an office pool on whether or not Willie will make $1 million or more in 2006.
I’ll take “no” for $20.
My guess is $800,000.
Willie’s value on this team is the 25th man. Not necessarily a great defender, but versatile, and a solid base runner, probably the go-to pinch runner on the team.
Beyond that, he doesn’t have any value to this team, and should never be considered to start.
Now that Jarrod Washburn is a Mariner, Willie loses about 3 starts a year. Thank god I won’t have to hear Ron Fairly talk about that again.
Player A since 2002 (BA/SLG/OBP)
.260/.341/.307
Player B since 2002:
.261/.341/.308
Player A is Fernando Vina. Player B is Willie Bloomquist. The major difference is that Vina didn’t play 2005 in the majors. Expecting a 37 year old middle infielder who hasn’t outhit a no-hit 27 year old middle infielder, let alone to push a 22 year old middle infielder for a starting job…well, I’m pretty sure this speaks to the organizational weaknesses Dave’s been talking about. I’ll let you figure out which one that is.
If they were serious about this instead of doing the usual spring training things of “challenging” young players, they’d bring in someone like D’Angelo Jimenez.
Now that Jarrod Washburn is a Mariner, Willie loses about 3 starts a year. Thank god I won’t have to hear Ron Fairly talk about that again.
Don’t speak too soon…My prediction for the number of times Fairly brings it up during Washburn’s first five starts: 3.
So I’m thinking the Ms catering to signing ‘the nice guys’ is one marketing strategy, and the Ms signing Everett to prove that they want to win, that they want competitive fire is also a marketing ploy. It’s just targeted at different segments of the fan base.
and a poster above talked about how the Ms apparently stink at recognizing true leadership capabilities in the clubhouse, then how would they be any better at recognizing ‘oh, he’ll light a fire in the belly of our players’ qualities like Everett is allegedly supposed to bring. they’re both character issues.
the form letter i got from them re: everett makes it pretty clear, from lincoln’s desk, that they’re sick of losing and recognize the fans are also. they say they need to take some risks and that everett is one such risk. i’ve never believed that the FO didn’t care about winning – people don’t make it in business like these guys without being hella competitive – i’ve just believed that they do a lousy job of evaluating talent and clearly, risk. and it doesn’t seem like that’s changing.
Dave,
I think this was an outstanding post and much of the commentary was useful, too.
I think I would add to the Organizational weaknesses a refusal to simply “Blow Up” the current team and try to build anew (rather than patch the current).
The M’s have a weak farm system. The M’s have a team that has some talent, but also some holes. The M’s don’t have the payroll capacity to fill the holes via free agency. In similar circumstances the Marlins (admittedly under great financial duress) traded most every player of any value for prospects. Lots of prospects. The blown up Marlins, sans Sheffield, McGriff, et al (circa 1997) won a World Series in 2003. I am willing to hazard that this year’s Marlins (sans Beckett, Jones, Castillo, Pierre, et al) will be awful BUT that they will be in the World Series before will be the Mariners.
Sometimes the desire/need to win NOW precludes winning more later; the FO’s desire to win might be the root cause of some awful signings. The pressure to win now must be even more extreme when folks write that this is a must-win” season and call for a GM’s head.
I don’t see much long-term patience in a FO that brings in Washburn at big bucks, signs Vina (even to a ml contract), brings in Dino-man Everett, etc. It’s a team that’s spending $90M to win 80 games if all goes well; but the M’s are failing to leave the financial flexibility and personnel options to improve upon those 80 wins if they do occur.
It’s boils to these scenarios: 1)things go as planned, the team wins 80 games but cannot improve, or 2) things go badly and the team has no chits (money or prospects) through which to improve.
I agree with all of the points you make here Dave, pro and con. I’ll enlarge on two further great plancks in mine eye on the negative side:
In addition to being sub-mediocre at public relations, the ownership group is addicted to spin. This does _not_ include Bavasi, but ownership and the FO have what seems a congenital resistance to actually leveling with anyone regarding anything.
The Ms have a strong revenue stream, and yes, they are willing to spend, a good thing. But they are too willing to paper over problems with dollar bills, to throw money at a roster or public perception problem rather than to get smart concerning the issue involved. Much as I detest the signing of Jarrod “3.20″ Washburn, the market for starting pitchers this offseason was very poor, and one can see forced choices to a degree. The Everett signing, on the other hand, was an example of simply throwing money at the lack of lefthanded power on the 25-man, and the public disquiet with that situation. He’s not a solution, he’s a contract used as a figleaf. (Or something.)
Since too many people with executive responsibility in the Ms org can’t seem to level with issues and have the money to spend to paper over small and mid-size problems, I have no expectation that they will learn from the other kinds of structural mistakes you speak to, Dave, or build on their existing strengths in a deliberate fashion.
The org _does_ seem to learn from HUGE past mistakes, witness the increased importance given to significant in-system prospects after the horrors of the Lowe/Varitek and Cruz, Jr. debacles. Still, with Bill Bavasi primed to take the fall if, as seems most probable, the Ms flounder and stink for most of or all of the ’06 season, Ms ownership has thus achieved the critical executive positioning on team performance of having a body in position to absorb the blast, another reason why the survivors going into next offseason will learn little or nothing from the smaller but still cumulative organizational misapprehensions mentioned here that imply that probable outcome. The Seattle Os seems like the most realistic future of the next five years. You can pronounce that as “Oh-nos” or “Zeros” as is yer preference.
. . . Now, if the Ms had signed the other fella this offseason, Aron “4.20″ Washington, the results would be positive for most when he gets smoked on the mound this year, too. But, no.
An interesting meme in this thread is the idea that the FO really does want to win, but the fan base thinks they’re happy to lose if they still make money.
I think this really highlights Dave’s point about them being bad at PR. The recent squabble about what their payroll really is is a great case in point. The FO is habitually evasive about payroll, and that makes people suspicious. When a common complaint from your customers is that you’re skimping on the quality budget, and you’re not, isn’t it a bad idea to be obviously spinning on the subject?
#40– when speaking of where the team is at this point in the off-season, Bavasi talked about still wanting pitching, but what are the odds they pull in any other NRI position players? I started thinking about this, after noticing two names from the Out-Of-Baseball File pop-up today: JR House and Bobby Estalella
oh, and re:#57– most teams are less than forthcoming about their finances.
#19 Thats an extremely powerful point…. and it highlights the true value of a *stat-head* approach….perhaps the M’s are really only a few stat-heads and a couple of years away from implementing the philosophy away from chronically contending….
There’s a big difference between NOT wanting to win and not knowing HOW to win…. however for all practical purposes teams constructed under both circumstances are equally frustrating to watch…. To be *fixed* both circumstances require changes in leadership management positions…
Yes, I think it’s been pointed out that the leadership (primarily in the case of Mattox and Armstrong, probably Lincoln) don’t know HOW to win. They are deficient in talent evaluation and risk assessment, and I’m afraid that Bela is right in that they are not going to learn from mistakes–they’re going to fire the people who have learned the most over the past few years.
[ot, there's a whole post on this]
So, how did Armstrong and Lincoln go from knowing how to win in 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2001 to not knowing how to win in 2006?
That’s a facile answer, to blame them. They didn’t go from being smart to being stupid. It’s an organizational problem.
#64: Thats kinda what I said…..
Well, actually, I’d put it that the organization won in those years…I wouldn’t say that they knew HOW they did it.
Yes, it’s an organizational problem, but the organization’s princples and plan has to come from an individual or set of individuals…and that plan has to be signed off on by higher ups. Who have to have a good sense on what works and what doesn’t.
If there were individuals who DID know how to win, they would be remaking organizational priorities to make it so.
Despite what I said in the thread on the AP 8/31 payroll article about M’s FO pronouncements on payroll all being “crap” and “self-serving drivel,” I agree with you that the FO does want to win, and is putting enough resources to that task that is ought to be enough to get the job done. I also agree with several posters who said (generally) that running the team as a business is a good idea, has gotten the team to its current level of respectability, and there is nothing wrong with turning a profit.
So why my constant frustration with the Mariners discussion of payroll and their financials? One reason is that they habitually (and fairly transparently) lie — or at least “spin” — this stuff that it just bugs me on principal. But it is more than that. I want the Mariners to make money in the long run — lots of it — but I get VERY tired of their inflexibility on financial matters. In 2001 and 2002 (and to a lesser extent 2000 and 2003), there was an open window to true World Series contention, and every freakin’ year there was some excuse why they couldn’t go the extra mile to give the team the boost that might have gotten them over the hump. Lincoln famously repeated the line (of BS) that the team couldn’t spend more than 50% of revenues or they’d go bankrupt at every opportunity (ignoring the fact that many, many major league teams do just that — including the Mariners at many points of their history, including the early part of this ownership group’s regime). So, while I want them to make money in the long run, as a fan I want to evidence that the FO cares enough about winning to be unprofitable in the short run, in order to make a serious stab at contention when the window is open (which it is not now, granted). When THAT happens, I will be a much happier fan, and the FO will gain loads and loads of credibility with me. Until then . . . not so much.
Re: #67, well put.
The scenario described in #21 isn’t the case – the FO is clearly not interested in just using the team purely from a profit-generating standpoint (a la the grand old days of Argyros).
From observing the actions – not the words – of this regime, it seems that they ARE interested in winning, but primarily as a method to maximize the sustained profitability of the franchise. If they were truly interested in winning for winning’s sake, they would have spent that extra money to get the crucial additional piece in 2001/2002, as well as making administrative personnel changes to address their glaring and continued problems with organizational decision-making. Instead, we see the same people involved, the same mistakes being repeated, and the same level of consistent mediocrity that the Mariners have become infamous for.
Lou Piniella is relentless in his pursuit of winning baseball. The FO helped usher him out the door. That alone tells you what you need to know about the Mariners’ organizational priorities.