“Kevin Jarvis warm in the bullpen, Melvin’s got the towel ready… he’s wiping his hands off. I guess his hands were dirty, Dave.”
“No question about it Rick, you can see on the replay–”
“And there goes the towel! Jarvis is coming in from the bullpen and we’ll be right back after this time-out.”
Not to pick on Art Thiel, I’m just using this as a starting point. He writes about the team’s start (“Mariners’ early struggles cause for concern“)
“Indeed, 10 percent of a baseball season is a small sample from which to make sweeping conclusions. Teams have rallied from deeper holes to greater glories, none more recently than the 2003 Florida Marlins.”
You want to wait 30, maybe 40 games before you start to draw any conclusions about the overall strength of the team. Unbalanced play at the start of the season makes this particularly true right now.
That said, one of the reasons the Marlins turned their season around was they fired their manager and put Jack McKeon on the bench. It paid off all year long: McKeon’s so old-school his ideas seem new to people, but he’s generally been much less concerned about pitcher roles than the LaRussa managers, and also willing to flex his lineups around to fit as much talent on it as possible. The Marlins called up Miguel Cabrera, made trades to beef up the lineup… when McKeon got them back on track, they reinforced success.
None of these options seem likely for the Mariners. Melvin’s unlikely to be fired (and given the absence of more-qualified candidates we can be sure would be better, why would we?), so that kind of turnaround is unlikely. The team doesn’t have any impact position players in the high minors ready to step up and contribute in the way Cabrera did. They’ve been historically unwilling to trade for high-salary players, even those they really need, and to expend stockpiled farm system talent to win that year. The best thing we’ve got in that department might be Soriano, who could step into the rotation when he’s healthy, and maybe — and I’m reluctant to mention this — King Felix as a Francisco Rodriguez-type bullpen addition.
Generally though, while their are outliers (teams that start hot and suck, teams that start slow and win 102 games on the season), we find that teams that start slowly are indeed bad. We like to drag the A’s out, but again, the difference is so large: the A’s are a team that Beane constantly improves through the season, while the M’s play the hand they’re dealt on Opening Day, and have for years. When you look at teams that have started like the M’s have, you find a lot of teams that finished shy of 80 wins on the season, a few that broke .500, and very few that did well for themselves.
Because that deals with larger aggregates, it’s probably a more accurate indicator than (say) player comparisons, too.
Someone pointed me to this Art Thiel column. It echoes something in Levesque’s column. Bavasi’s trying to spread the word that he’s into stats, which if he believes that he is, is actually more disturbing than the alternative. The team tried to hire Craig Wright, but failed, and —
Bavasi is continuing his search, but the market is competitive.
Qualified analysts are in such demand that the best sign non-compete clauses so they don’t work for two clubs in the same division or league.
The Mariners are still looking.
“We do our own stats, but you need a guy who thinks out of the box,” Bavasi said.
If you want a guy who thinks out of the box, you can’t look in the box for him.
It’s moments like this I wish I hadn’t been a Mariners fan, and written so much publically-archived material on the team and my opinion of their management. I’m over here!! Look, and here’s Jason, and Dave knows the minors really well! Helllloooooooooooooo!!!!
Probably be a pretty short interview, though.
“Tell us what you guys bring to the team that we don’t already have.”
“A dissenting voice, first. We can make cogent arguments about why the moves you’re making might not be in the best interest of the team, offer better, cheaper alternatives, and help add a depth of knowledge the organization has historically lacked.”
“We’re really more of a team here in the front office… this dissent thing, it wouldn’t fit in with the team concept we’ve worked so hard to build.”
“Dissent doesn’t have to be personal, or divisive. Only good can come of honest discussion and arguments and it’ll make the organization better from–”
“Thanks for coming in.”
Here’s the big thing, though: Thiel makes a huge, huge error in his column:
He also knows that most of the recent A’s stars — Tim Hudson, Barry Zito, Mark Mulder, Jason Giambi, Miguel Tejada, Eric Chavez — were acquired before Beane’s arrival, using traditional methods.
This is false. I mean it’s flat out, verifiably false, something that even the barest of fact checking would have revealed.
As Rob Neyer pointed out in this column, “Beane was the A’s assistant general manager in 1997, when Hudson was drafted, and he was general manager in 1998 and 1999 when Mulder and Zito were drafted.”
This is at best lazy writing by Thiel, taking something Bavasi said (which would still be wrong) and paraphrasing it without looking it up, followed by sloppy fact-checking (if any was done) by the PI. But I don’t understand how stuff this wrong gets printed, when it takes a couple of minutes and a web search to determine that.
Further, mocking Oakland’s skew towards college drafting, as Bavasi does earlier, should spur Thiel to note that of those guys, in order that he mentions them —
Hudson – Auburn University
Zito – USC
Mulder – Michigan State University
Giambi – Long Beach State University
only Miguel Tejada and Eric Chavez weren’t drafted out of college.
Paul at the good ship S.S. Mariner writes a neat bit on Ibanez and the good-guy thing.
I’d like to add one thing: if the manager’s job is to keep the team running smoothly and massage personalities (because the bench coach handles strategy, and so forth), what’s the point of having him when your clubhouse is composed of all these happy-go-lucky clubhouse presences? Why not forgo the manager, throw his salary on the pile with Kazu’s money, and invest it all in bonds? And not Barry Bonds– that would be smart.
I’ll say that again:
I want to make it clear that this is intended to make a point, and I don’t support this at all
I don’t think Raul Ibanez’s contract was the worst ever. I don’t think he’s somehow responsible for their losses. My point was only that you could, if you wanted to, pretty easily construct an argument that that was the case, just as it’s been argued that because he contributed to some wins, he’s a great pickup and Bavasi’s amazingly keen for having picked him up.
Just for clarification, I don’t think Derek was really serious when he called the Ibanez signing the worst in team history. As much as we dislike his contract and think that it exemplifies everything that is wrong with the organization right now, he’d have to suck at astronomical levels to match the head-scratchers handed to Greg Hibbard, Pete O’Brien, or either of the last two contracts given to Dan Wilson, especially the 3 year, $13 million anchor that he got after the 1999 season.
My posting will be erratic (read: likely nonexistant) through the weekend, so, to make sure our tremendous readers don’t feel neglected, here is what is on top for next week at USSM: An updated Future Forty and more in-depth look at the team’s defensive performance in 2004, compared to the rest of the league, as well as your usual daily banter and game recaps.
Oh, and Chris Snelling missing yet another season just sucks. Seriously, baseball needs guys like Chris Snelling. The M’s need a guy like Chris Snelling. There was absolutely nothing bad about the Chris Snelling, major league player story, and for it to have gone this horribly wrong just sucks.
Derek and I were at the game today, so as you might imagine, a good time was had by all (despite the loss).
He’s not kidding when he says the defense was awful. And by defense, we mean “Randy Winn.” Well, primarily at least. Eric Karros’ “double” in the 7th was a joke — Winn was in position to make the play and simply dropped the ball. Honestly, I don’t know what the Safeco official scorer is smoking sometimes. Next up, Winn misplays a single to center, allowing Karros to score from second (note: I see they changed this one to an error, which I actually disagree with, because it’s debatable Winn would have thrown him out anyway). Finally, Bloomquist misplays a grounder between first and second, allowing Dye to score from second (another note: wouldn’t they be better off defensively with Bloomquist at second and Cabrera at first?).
OK, I’m not quite done yet.
Willie Bloomquist at first base. This is wrong on so many levels. How sad is it when your first baseman, who should be one of the two or three best hitters on your team, has to bat ninth? I’m glad to see Melvin sitting Olerud against a tough lefty like Mark Mulder, but the guy taking his place shouldn’t be Bloomquist. It should be a guy like Karros, who the A’s picked up for a mere $550K. Or Greg Colbrunn, who we even had once upon a time. These guys are around; you just have to find them.
At the same time, if you’re going to sit Bret Boone, why not do so against a tough right-hander? Arg.
USSM Flashback: Conduct for Being on the Real One Video Screen and Getting Your Mug on the R1VS.
In response to this column (and I want to make it clear that this is intended to make a point, and I don’t support this at all, and Raul Ibanez is not the worst signing in Mariner history)
(seriously, this is a parody, and not to be taken seriously)
Raul Ibanez was a terrible signing, worst in Mariner history.
When the Mariners got out to a 0-5 start, where was Ibanez? He was responsible for those losses:
April 6, 5-10: Ibanez gets a hit but fails to drive in any runs as the Mariners lose their home opener. A cleanup hitter needs to drive runners in, and Ibanez utterly failed to do so.
April 7, 7-10: Ibanez again fails to drive in any runs in this tight loss, even leaving one in scoring position with two outs. That’s when you want your clutch guys to come through, and that’s what Ibanez is here for. His failure to produce in the clutch costs the team a win and starts them off 0-2
April 8, 1-5: For the third game in a row, Ibanez utterly fizzles as the cleanup hitter. Not even a single RBI to this point for the team’s go-to man, the left-handed power bat that is supposed to drive this offense. The team is swept by Anahiem and now things look bad. Morale deteriorates, and it’s time for Ibanez to show some leadership and bring the team around.
April 9, 6-8: Ibanez fails to do so. Benched in favor of McCracken, Ibanez wastes his pinch-hit appearance, leaving a runner in scoring position with two out, killing a rally and ending the team’s last good chance at winning the game.
April 10, 1-2: Ibanez finally produces in the clutch, hitting a single to score Ichiro. However, in his other two at bats he lets the team down, when any hit would have provided a spark to break Tim Hudson’s rhythm. Ibanez also fails to homer, which would have tied the game.
And after a win, Ibanez immediately returned to skunking the team.
April 13, 5-7: Ibanez drops to the five hole and does nothing but get a sacrifice fly. The four guys in front of him were on base nine times, and all he got was one RBI? Ibanez’s failure to drive in runs does the team in, as they lose by two runs.
April 14, 5-6: Ibanez goes 0-3 and again can’t manage to drive in any runs, despite having the four guys ahead of him on base seven times. Any hit at any point would have been the balance of the game, plus getting caught stealing ended up snuffing a rally chance, turning a baserunner into an out.
And then again:
April 16, 0-5 : Ibanez is baffled by noted ace Chan Ho Park. Ibanez strikes out twice and leaves six (six!) men on base, a black hole in the center of the lineup, sucking all potential rallies in where they’re never heard from again.
And these last two losses can be squarely laid at Ibanez’s feet:
April 21st, 4-7: Ibanez leaves two men on and fails to drive in any runs as the team goes down to Tim Hudson again. His double play destroy’s the team’s chance to get back into the game and shuts the door on the team.
April 22nd, 2-8: Another no-RBI game for Ibanez, another loss for the team.
There’s no doubting that Ibanez has played a crucial role in every one of the Mariners ten losses. We can only speculate as to how well they’d do without him, but it looks like they’d go 16-0.
Okay, I’m done with that silliness. My point is this: It’s easy to make players look good or bad, and you can assign wins and losses to individual players if that’s what you want to do, but you can’t draw conclusions from that kind of shoe-gazing.
And, now that I think about it, my second point is “If that argument is so dumb and ridiculous, isn’t the opposite argument also equally ridiculous?”
Today’s game.
Can someone explain why Guardado was available to pitch the ninth inning of a blowout but wasn’t put in yesterday, when the team desperately needed him? What’s the point?
The defense looked awful, awful, awful. I don’t care if they only get one error, there were many really bad plays.
Here’s an example of how the team’s inflexibility hurts us. Given three players:
Player A, has played centerfield well, played right corner well, great arm, good range
Player B, has played centerfield okay, played left corner well, weak arm, average range
Player C, has played left corner okay, good arm, average, maybe below-average range
And given that you must play all three of them in the outfield, the best solution is clear:
Player B goes to left, where they can use their range while their arm isn’t an issue
Player A goes to center, where they’ll rock
Player C goes to right, where his limited range won’t be quite an issue, but his arm has use
You’ve got the same bats in the lineup, but suddenly your defense plays to each of their strengths and weaknesses, rather than mismatch everyone. I mean seriously, we can’t be the only people who see this. This organizational fixation on keeping players where they’re doing well and never trying to make the most of their talents… it’s near-sighted and dumb.
This is the same thing we see a lot with Melvin: Jolbert Cabrera’s playing second, Bloomquist is at first, and in the ninth, with two outs, Melvin lets Cabrera, a righty, hit against Bradford, a righty-killer, while Dave Hansen goes to the on-deck circle for Bloomquist.
Sure, they’re down 8-2, but if you’re going to start firing your rounds in the ninth, how about pinch-hitting a lefty (Olerud or Hansen) for Wilson and then the other for Cabrera? Sure, you lose your second baseman, but isn’t that what Willie’s versatility is all about? Hansen or Olerud goes to first, Bloomquist to second.
Anyway, longer post to follow.