Game 136, Mariners at Indians
RRS v Jackson. 10:05 our time.
Value of starting versus closing
WoTYC, 2, Paul B:
“I’m still curious about how Morrow’s value as a starter compares to his value as a reliever. Potentially, and making appropriate assumptions of course.”
Interestingly, almost two years ago baseball analysts had almost exactly the same argument about Jonathan Papelbon. Papelbon stayed a closer. If I can boil the whole thing down, when you account for the value of the innings they pitch, a top-tier closer is worth as much to their team as almost all starters are. That varies, of course, by how the manager uses them. “Only the 9th, only 1-3 run lead” closers end up being a lot less valuable than ones that pitch in ties and can pitch in the eighth.
So take a look at, say, WPA on fangraphs, which is a fair measure of how well a player did when it could most affect the team’s success.
Of the top 30 right now, the breakdown is essentially:
18 starters
7 relievers who’ve closed since the start of the season
5 late-inning relievers.
There are a couple issues to look at then:
– Is it easier to find a replacement for him as a starter or a reliever?
– Is his stuff particularly well-suited to one role or the other?
– If Morrow is better in short stints throwing all out, is he that much better that it outweighs the contribution he’d make in innings as a starter?
In rough order: it’s easier to find relievers who can close. Every year, a bunch of closers and late inning relievers show up and do well without a previous resume. They’re converted starters, failed starters, castoffs, injury recovery dudes, college closers, whatever. Pitchers who don’t have to pace themselves can throw harder, and don’t have to have the multi-pitch arsenal of a starter who’ll have to face the same hitters over and over. Pitchers with huge platoon splits or other vulnerabilities can have a good manager put them in situations where they’re well-suited to succeed, while a starting pitcher can only be so vulnerable in any area before they’re reduced to total ineffectiveness.
Look at the list of relievers in the top 30 WPA pitchers right now. There’s easily a half-dozen names on that list that at least at the start of the year would have drawn blank looks if you’d thrown them out at an average fantasy draft and certainly weren’t household names. This, incidentally, is something the M’s have done really well over recent years — picking guys out of the farm system for an eye towards filling out a bullpen with cheap, young, effective arms.
Then the question of what Morrow is suited for. Durability enters into this: when we compare the relative valuation of relievers against starters, there’s an assumption that the injury risk is the same. Your opinion on this may vary — relievers throw at maximum effort more frequently, but for much shorter times, while starters toss a hundred pitches in a row at a significantly lower exertion. Here, it’s hard to offer outside analysis. This is entirely a judgment call by teams.
Does Morrow, in particular, have characteristics that make him more suitable for relief? He does. One of the things Silver found in looking at successes and failures of relief conversions was that both strikeout rate and walk rate were associated with relief success, as was having a low ISO (SLG-AVG). Groundball rate was not, which surprised me, since that’s so closely tied with not giving up home runs. Morrow’s had some issues with walks, though that doesn’t seem to be an inseparable part of his game in the way that it is for (say) Jenks.
Morrow’s ISOs, by year: 105, 127 — that’s significantly under the major league average (which stands at 150 right now)
Silver, theorizing on the why:
A relief role emphasizes high-impact pitching and deemphasizes consistency and durability. A low ISO is a good proxy for high-impact pitching, a pitcher who can take control of the at-bat with one or two great pitches. Meanwhile, a low BB rate is a good proxy for mechanical consistency.
How good does Morrow have to be as a starter to make it an even swap, entirely in terms of value contributed? Here’s Silver again regarding Papelbon:
…, and we find that a 2.00 ERA closer is roughly as valuable as a 3.69 ERA, 200-inning starting pitcher.
What we wouldn’t give for a 3.69 ERA, 200-inning pitcher. He’d be the second-best pitcher in the rotation, by a long ways. And again, it’s a lot easier to find a replacement pitcher for the bullpen than it is to find a replacement starter who can put up that kind of line.
Morrow’s stuff may be better suited for a bullpen role, and we know that he’s done well there so far. The determining question seems to be his durability: if Morrow can go 200 innings in a season in the near future without increasing the risk he’ll be injured, then he should be starting.
But here’s the other issue, which hasn’t really been discussed enough yet: over the last two years, we’ve seen Morrow’s development take an odd path, as he’s struggled not only with command but with falling in love with the fastball when he’s experiencing success with it, not mixing pitches, and so on. One of the happy storylines this season was seeing him start to overcome those difficulties. Starting forces him to confront those weaknesses in a way that late-inning relief doesn’t, and in Morrow’s case this makes the decision to try starting him the right one. If Morrow has (say) potentially three plus pitches and relieving means that he relies on two of them, throwing 85% fastballs for the rest of his career, that’s a huge amount of potential wasted. That role can be filled by anyone who can throw fast and has a decent change.
If Morrow’s conversion to starting means that he’s challenged to work on and effectively throw more pitches, work batters better, mix up his stuff and become smarter about pitching, there are a couple of possible outcomes:
– He succeeds, and becomes a more valuable starter than he’d have been a reliever over the long term
– He succeeds, but the durability issues force him back to the bullpen having improved the very things that often have held him back from domination as a reliever
— He fails, and goes back to the bullpen and we get the Morrow we’ve seen of 07-08
Since Morrow’s attempt at starting’s not going to make a difference for this year’s team and the benefits will be reaped by a future club with a shot at contention, starting’s the way to go.
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This post was written as one of the requests by a USSM supporter as part of Thank You Content Week. Join them!
Future of Sports Writing
WoTYC, 1, JMHawkins:
“The future of sports writing? How blogs and the imminent demise of traditional newspapers…”
I don’t think there will be a distinction in a few years. Look at what even our local media’s doing: they all ru Mariner-related blogs. The amount of resources they devote to it vary greatly, but they’re all there. ESPN’s run Neyer and then others as blogs for years with great success. At the same time, papers are seeing their print circulation drop, yes. We’re almost certainly guaranteed to see a one-paper town in Seattle soon, which will be terrible even for sports fans.
We’re going to be at a place soon where the beat reporters and columnists compete with the bloggers almost entirely online, where the daily subscriber count that matters will be RSS and not inked papers tossed on porches (or yards/driveways/so on). The King County Journal’s went this way already — they’re essentially a well-funded, employs-a-ton-of-people blog with a content manager, splintered into community sites and tiny near-pamphlet papers.
Here, this means the M’s will continue to pick and choose the electronic coverage from the press box based on their favor. The Times beat writer has a print column and a blog? Here’s your pass. The Tacoma beat writer has a print column and a blog? Watch from the seats. Everett Herald? In. USSM has a blog read by more people than the Herald’s outlets combined? Out. Some boot-licking blog? In. We see this now: when MLB put out a policy on electronic media, teams needed to give creds to ESPN.com, CBS Sportsline, and MLB.com, and that was it. That’s where the M’s drew the line. I got a press pass once when I was writing for Baseball Prospectus where I had to promise that anything I saw or learned would only be used for the annual, and wouldn’t go out on the website. If you work for a newspaper, you don’t have to make that promise.
That’s not true with other franchises, where teams wave in quality and blogs, do interviews with them, and look at that as an opportunity to reach out to fans that may not be listening if they do 10m on the morning sports talk show, and so on. The M’s aren’t that team, and they’re in good company.
This draws an artificial distinction in which the press pass is a license to print money in many ways. If I can’t go ask Riggleman to talk about his bunting strategy, you can’t get that post here. But you can get a ton of player and manager quotes where the M’s deign to grant access, and that makes those places more popular, and in turn (whether recipients like to admit this or not) the more restricted the passes are, the more it gives the M’s leverage over the outlets granted passes.
It also entirely destroys that category of story, which is unfortunate. One of the great current advantages of blogs over print coverage is that we’re free to explore topics in a level of depth a print reporter can’t today and has not incentive to in today’s environment. A beat reporter’s life right now is being beat up by the schedule, trying to turn around game stories and other notebook content. It’s pretty easy to see where both of those get wiped by a future without print deadlines, of course. But they’re already busy enough without having to take time to research injury rates for minor league prospects over the course of an entire season to try and find out if their team has a real problem.
When we write the bunting strategy, there’s no quote from Riggleman on the subject that doesn’t come from a game story or other content written up by people with no interest in the bunting strategy question, and those quotes end up being without a larger context that might be the most enlightening thing we discuss all year.
I’m not sure that’s worth the price, though, for two reasons. If you read Tracy Kidder, who wrote Soul of a New Machine
Moreover, though, if the only thing that distinguishes a credentialed reporter from the hordes of bloggers is the access they have to get player and manager quotes, then they’re much less likely to endanger their livelihood by angering the players who’ll talk to them, much less the team. It doesn’t even have to be a conscious choice. If there’s a player who talks to a writer all the time and sucks horribly, they’re going to get a lot longer to turn it around before being torn into compared to a sullen kid who skips interviews. Beyond which, it’s human — who wants to walk into a locker room filled with people who hate them?
All of this is multiplied by who writes the checks. A beat reporter for a paper writes a nearly-daily game story, some additional content, and every two weeks has a check cut from their publisher, while Dave and I make some fraction of that amount by people hitting a Paypal button and sending us a couple of bucks (or dropping us a line with an extra ticket, or buying me a beer when we run into each other pre-game). As a result, we’re fitting writing around everything else in our lives, researching the things that interest us, knowing that for the most part, the comparatively fractional reward we receive is a direct validation of what we’re working on.
Right now, that imbalance means that there’s a vast swath of content you need to go off-paper for. If you want to read about how Ibanez sucks, or some serious analysis into in-game strategy, you have to go to the blogs. If you want a seriously considered lament about the state of the franchise, you have to go to the blogs.
And this is all dwarfed by the power of the television behemoth. Pre-and-post-game analysis of wretched quality, unparalleled access to players and coaches, and the broadcast crew which can entirely dominate the way everyone who follows the team talks about it. I’d love for there to be alternate broadcast tracks out of FSN control, but that’s never, ever going to happen under current licensing terms. The power of all the beat reporters pales in comparison to that crew in painting the perception of the game, the players, on up through the whole organization. We’re all small bugs playing in their shadow.
I don’t see that changing. The market for people who want to read game stories and box scores is a lot less lucrative than the broadcast itself. The market for a long discussion of in-game strategy is a lot more limited than I’d like it to be. I don’t know if it’s large enough to sustain full-time writers in the best of circumstances, and I’ll skip the USSM viability question here.
At the same time, we see the lines blurring. Geoff Baker’s blog contains video snippets, random photos, and other content that you don’t see in a traditional beat column, the kind of thing that’s taking the press pass and using it to expand coverage — which, to circle back around, is exactly the kind of thing the M’s press office won’t allow people who aren’t Geoff Baker to do, which in turn makes it even more unique and interesting. But there’s no way to look at that kind of work and say that Baker’s strictly a print reporter any more.
I don’t think things will change in Seattle in the coming years unless there’s an ownership shakeup that results in tech-saavy people gaining control and changing policy. But in other places, there’s a very real chance that the average fan will get to pick the flavor of coverage that most suits them, and it won’t be a choice between the traditional coverage of the papers and the no-access outsider analysis of blogs, it’ll be between dozens of smaller, non-professional outlets and a few well-equipped and probably personality-based outfits offering multimedia coverage, some of which will rise from the masses and others representative of more traditional media outlets.
I’m looking forward to the chaos.
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This post was written as one of the requests by a USSM supporter as part of Thank You Content Week. Join them!
The Groundballingest Groundballer Who Ever Groundballed
You know, I need to apologize to Roy Corcoran – I don’t know that we’ve said more than 20 words about you on the blog this year, and your performance deserves recognition. In a season where few things have gone right, you’ve been a shining beacon of success, and I can’t believe it’s taken us this long to write about you. So, mea culpa, Roy – here’s your post.
Corcoran, a career minor leaguer, has a K/BB rate of 1.27 – that’s not good at all. Anything below 2.00 is usually a problem, and for a quality reliever, the general expectation is closer to 3.00. Shut down late inning pitchers generally throw strikes and miss bats, while Corcoran doesn’t do either. His command isn’t good and he’s a pitch to contact guy, which is generally a terrible combination. However, Corcoran has been extremely effective this year, thanks to one special skill – ground balls.
Corcoran is a ground ball machine. His 70.2% GB% is the highest of any pitcher in baseball with at least 50 IP this year, and it’s not close – Brandon Webb is second at 65.5%. He gets more ground balls than Brad Ziegler, the A’s rookie side-armer who made national news by not allowing a run for the first few months of his career. In fact, the only pitcher who can compete with Corcoran in ground ball tendencies is Chad Bradford, also a side-armer, who is barely edging out Corcoran with a 70.6% GB% (but in fewer innings).
Corcoran gets so much sink on his fastball that the only guys in the majors who induce the grounder as often are guys who release the ball from as close to their shoes as possible. There isn’t another traditional pitcher alive who gets hitters to pound the ball into the dirt with the same frequency. Considering that the average AL hitter has a .499 OPS on ground balls (compared with a .782 OPS on fly balls and a 1.727 OPS on line drives), it’s easy to see why Corcoran has been able to rack up so many outs through sheer quantity of grounders.
Now, like pretty much every other sinker/slider right-handed pitcher, Corcoran isn’t nearly as good as left-handed hitters, and his skill set basically makes him a Sean Green clone – a few more ground balls, a few less strikeouts, but overall, the same package. It’s not the traditional relief ace package, but it works wonders against RHBs, and as part of a bullpen that has situational specialists, it works great.
Corcoran isn’t going to be a star, and because of his lack of a weapon against lefties, he’s always going to be better suited to a role where the manager can use him to face a run of right-handed bats, but don’t let the high walks and low strikeouts fool you into thinking that Corcoran’s getting lucky. He really can get outs with his sinker, and he’s just more evidence that you simply don’t need to spend any real resources to build a bullpen.
With Corcoran, Green, and Putz, the M’s have a very good collection of RH relievers. Don’t let all this talk about them missing Morrow fool you – this organization doesn’t need a classic strikeout reliever who dominates with a high 90s fastball. Just get a good lefty to complement the groundball twins, and you’ll have a great bridge to Putz.
A slightly different note
Attempting to be ridiculously specific since there’s always people complaining about the poll question or options or trying to invent their own poll or what the heck ever and it’s really really annoying, even though I know this will do nothing to prevent it:
The Overlooked Organizational Issue
As has been covered, well, everywhere, the Mariners have a few problems. They’ll be hiring a new GM and a new manager this winter, and we’re hopeful that they’ll recognize the need for a new direction and new philosophies in how the team is run.
However, just hiring a new GM isn’t going to just miraculously turn this team around. He’s going to have to do more than just make good trades and free agent signings, because this team needs to do a better job of developing talent from within. This isn’t a scouting problem – the M’s are one of the best teams in baseball in acquiring amateur talent through the draft and international free agency. They’re constantly bringing talent into the fold, including some guys with star potential.
However, once the kids get into the system, there are some problems. Here’s one of the glaring ones.
Carlos Triunfel: 6.3% BB%
Gregory Halman: 6.2% BB%
Matt Tuiasasopo: 9.8% BB%
Michael Saunders: 8.6% BB%
Adam Moore: 8.4% BB%
Rob Johnson: 8.4% BB%
Matt Mangini: 5.3% BB%
Daniel Carroll: 6.0% BB%
Alex Liddi: 9.1% BB%
Denny Almonte: 7.7% BB%
Jharmidy DeJesus: 7.4% BB%
That is, basically, a list of the draft picks or significant bonus international signings over the last few years, or guys who are considered real prospects by the organization. And, of course, their walk rate is listed next to their name. The A’s used to have a policy that they wouldn’t promote a prospect from one minor league level to the next unless he had a walk rate of at least 10% – none of these guys meet the mark.
Yes, Clement walks, and so does Dennis Raben, but both of those guys learned how to take the base on balls in college – they already had a set philosophy of how to hit by the time they got into the organization. Of the guys the M’s are trying to turn from teenagers into major leaguers, they just don’t develop anyone with any real patience at the plate.
This is obvious at the major league level as well. Obviously Lopez and Betancourt are hackity-hack-hack-hacks. Balentien is still a free swinger, even despite a lot of improvement the last few years. Adam Jones learned how to swing at everything before going to Baltimore. Even the big league guys the team has gone after have a grip-it-and-rip-it approach, from Beltre, Johjima, Guillen, and even Ichiro – the M’s love guys who swing a lot, and that’s what they’re developing.
This has to change, and just hiring a new GM and hoping that fixes the issue isn’t going to work. Whoever takes over is going to have to have the freedom to make sweeping changes in how the organization coaches its young talent and the things that they’re stressing in player development. It simply isn’t good enough to be developing a bunch of clones who have to hit .300 to succeed since they never learned how to make a pitcher work the count.
Out of curiosity…
AFL rosters out, M’s sending some dudes for additional sun
John D pointed out that Baseball America has published the AFL rosters with commentary. M’s headed out are:
RHP Gabriel Hernandez
LHP Justin Thomas
RHP Joe Woerman
C-R Adam Moore
OF-R Greg Halman
Game 133, Twins at Mariners
A rare 1:40pm start!
Perkins v Feierabend.
The ’09 Pitching Staff
For all that is wrong with this team, I wonder if people have realized that M’s have a pretty good pitching staff in place for next year.
A rotation of Felix, Bedard, Silva, Morrow, and Rowland-Smith is solid. Yes, there are question marks surrounding Bedard’s health, Silva’s talent, and how Morrow and Rowland-Smith convert from the bullpen, but there’s risks with any pitching staff, and there’s actual upside to that rotation. Rowland-Smith fills the Washburn role as the back-end flyball lefty who pitches well in Safeco, while Silva should regress back toward his mean (he’s not this bad) and be just mediocre instead of awful, while Morrow joins Bedard and Felix as the guys who miss a lot of bats and get outs by themselves.
The bullpen could use another good lefty, but Putz/Green/Lowe/Corcoran/Dickey gives the team lots of right-handed options. Bring in a guy like Jeremy Affeldt and all of the sudden you’ve got a contention-worthy bullpen.
When was the last time a team lost 100 games and still went into the following season with a complete pitching staff that didn’t need an overhaul to contend? Realistically, if the M’s are going to improve their roster this winter (and that’s TBD, of course, depending on the GM), they just need to overhaul the position players. The pitching staff isn’t a big problem, and for once, we can look forward to a winter where we’re not throwing ridiculous money at back-end starting pitchers.